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Introduction
Evolutionary stability, the central solution concept in evolutionary game theory, is closcly rclatcd to local asymptotic stability in a ccrtain nonlincar dynamical systcm opcrating on the state space, thc so-callcd "replicator dynamics". However, a purcly dynamical characterization of evolutionary stability is not available in an clcmentary manner. This characterization can be achieved by investigating socalled "derived games" which consist of mixed strategies corresponding to succesful states in thc original game. Thc purpose of this article is to provide a unified rcprescntation of both notation and terminology in order to maintain a coherent biological interpretation of mathematical results, the majority of which appear to bc scattcrcd in a broad spcctrum of litcraturc with similar mcthods of proof (Cor the rcaders' convenience, we shall present suitable variants of these arguments hcrc), but mostly of the form "cvolutionary stability implics dynamical stability".
An implication of the neverse form is theorem 2 in [ 16] . Very recently, an equivalence theorcm [4, thcorem 1] has been sta[ed explicitly without proof. Apart from being sclf-contained, this paper stresses the necessity to interpret monomorphic and polymorphic models-which in some instances seem to be confused with each other-in a different way, and presents a detailed discussion of (strong) asymptotic stability vcrsus (wcak) Lyapunov stability which also may shed some light on the cxtrcmality of cvolutionary stability.
The prototypical examples in the seminal papers of Maynard Smith and Price [9, 7] dcalt with stability of population states with thc aim to explain polymorphism of bchaviour (a state wherc diffcrent individuals may behave differently; cf. also the forcrunning article [12] ). Also, the concept of evolutionary stability seems-at least from the point of view of frequency-dependent selection-to be more stringent in the context of polymorphic states than in modcls under a monomorphic interpretation, fcaturing evolutionary stable strategies (played by everyone in the population) instead of evolutionary stable population states. So we start in the present article with the basic, polymorphic modcl, but the results obtained below may to some extent support thc monomorphistic approach, which plays a prominent role in recent literature (see, e.g. [4] , focussing also on the dynamical aspects in this context). To be more precise, the paper is organized as follows: section 1 dcals with (possibly) polymorphic populations consisting of individuals that display pure strategies only, while the subsequcnt scctions treat derived games where the original states now play the role of a single (mixed) strategy, and where the dynamical outcomes (i.e. the stable equilibria) are monomorphisms centered at that strategy. In section 2, the concurring states are dimorphisms [hroughout (only two types of behaviour present), while section 3 dcals with k-morphism setup for the derived games. Section 4 is devoted to wcak (Lyapunov) stability, and section 5 characterizes evolulionary stability in terms of stablc sets, focusing on the convergcnce of the average strategy played within the k-morphic population in the derivcd game.
To bcgin with, Iet us shortly recapitulate the simplest formal sctting of an evolutionary gamc i': assume that, in a ccrtain contest-like situation, individuals are capable to display n different types of behaviour which we for short call strategies in the sequel. With respect to this contest, the state of the population in question is then fully described by the state space zl where x; rcpresents thc rclative frequency of individuals displaying strategy i(for short callcd i-individuals in the scquel) within the population (thc symbol ' denotes transposition).
Thcre In this article, we assume that [he mean payoff (incremental filness) to an i-individual contesting with individuals belonging to a population in state x E S", dcpcnds lincarly upon the statc x. As shown in [3, pp. 61-64], this assumption essentially mcans that the con(lict is pairwise, i.e. there are always exactly two individuals participating in a contest. Therefore, if we denote by a;j the payoff of an i-individual in a confrontation with a j-individual, thcn
forms the n x n payoff matrix which fully characterizcs thc game. Indeed, the mean payoff to an i-individual contcsting with individuals bclonging to a population in In othcr words, a state p is evolutionarily stable if thc avcragc mcan payoff for a population in a differcnt statc q against p does not excced thc averagc mcan payoff within the population in statep (equilibrium condition), and if, in case of equality in the equilibrium condition, the state q has a lower average mean payoff within itself than p has against q (stability condition).
Following Taylor and Jonker (13), we introduce the replicator dynamics D( T') corresponding to the game T', which operates on the state space S" (a dot -denotes diffcrcntiation with respcct to timc t):
This dynamical system is one of the simplest models describing the evolution of the population over time: indced, the amount (Ax);-x'Ax by which the mean payoff for i-individuals exceeds-or is exceeded by-the average mean payoff, is considercd to be equal to the relative growth-or shrinking-rate~~x; of i-individuals. By mcans of the rcplicator dynamics we can now introduce a second stability notion as follows:
A statc p E S" is said to bc " dynamically stablc" in a game I', if and only if p constitutcs a locally asymptotically stable fixed point for the rcplicator dynamics ( r).
In other words, a state p is dynamically stable in T' if every trajectory x(t) that dcscribcs the cvolution according to D(T') tends to p (i.e., x(t) --~p as t~t~), whcnever it stancd in a state sufficiently close to p(i.e., if the distance from x(0) to p is small cnough).
Taylor and ]onker showed for general n x n-games that every evolutionarily stable state p is dynamically stable [13] . The converse is true for 2 x 2-games: here evolutionary and dynamical stability coincide (see, e.g. [2, theorem 30] or [17, p. 226]). On the othcr hand, some 3 x 3-games have dymamically stable equilibria that arc not evolutionarily stablc, as the following example due to Zeeman [19] shows: EXAMPLE For thc gamc T' given by
is dynamically stable, but not evolutionarily stable, since for q -[6~9,1~9,2~9]' we have p'Aq -10~27~32~81 -q'Aq.
Remark
A notion strongcr than dynamical stability is that of global (dynamical) stability: a statc p E S" is callcd "globally stablc", if cvcry trajcctory x(t) staning in lhc rclativc intcrior of S" tcnds to p as t-a t~. Onc rcadily secs that global and evolutionary stability are incompatible with each other: indeed, since there are gamcs T' with morc than onc cvolutionarily stablc sta[e, these cannot be globally stablc for L~( r,). On thc othcr hand, thc statc p in thc abovc cxamplc is cvcn globally stablc though not cvolutionarily stable.
Mixed strategies; derived 2 x 2-games
As the~emarks at the end of the previous section show, a purcly dynamical charactcrization of evolutionary stability is not availablc in a straightforward manncr. Nevenhcless, such a characterization seems to be desirable, and this is the main objcctive of thc prescnt paper. To achieve this, we shall pass from pure stratcgists' modcls to mixcd strategists' modcls (see, e.g. [5, [14] [15] [16] 11 ] , and [3, pp. 7-15]). Now it is important to distinguish bctwecñ polymorphic (population) statcs describing thc distribution of bchaviour within a population, and mixed (individual) strategies, which include probabilities n; for an individual to display bchaviour pattcrn i.
Hence, (polymorphic or monomorphic) states describe a statistical aspect while (mixed or pure) strategies refer to an individualistic aspect of behaviour. The term "probability n;" may have different interpretaions, e.g, tr; may correspond to relative frequencies in sequcntial contests, or to a change in behaviour with relative duration n; over lifetime.
A first stcp towards our goal is done by the following theorem, in which we use the notion of a derived 2 x 2-game which is a special case of an evolutionary mixcd strategy game investigated by Sigmund [Il] (following his lines, we shall treat the general case of derived k x k-games bclow). The rationale for this concept is the idca that individuals bclonging to a population in an evolutionarily stable state p, might adopt a mixed strategy in displaying behaviour pattem i with a probability n; that equals the frequency p; of i-individuals in state p.
Suppose there is a second state q x p that is adopted as a mixed strategy by some other individuals (putting n; -q;) in the same way, perhaps because q is also evolutionarily stable. Recall thcre are games that have several evolutionarily stable states (e.g. n in the game with payoff matrix A-l, the n x n-idcntity matrix); cf.
[3, pp. 76-81]. Furthcrmore assume that in this new situation, every individual adopts either p or q as a mixed strategy. Hence, all population states considered here are dimorphic: there are only two types of individuals, confrontations between them would best bc described in a game f'v~y which we call "derived game", and which has thc 2 x 2-payoff matrix
Av.v -[ 9~AP q~A9 J-[q~] A[ P. 9l ;
indeed, the first row of Avq is constituted by the payoffs for p, while the second represent thc payoffs for q. With respect to T'vq, a state of the population is of course fully dcscribcd by a vcctor 
Prooj
Assume that T' is represented by the payoff matrix A. Then the payoff matrix Ap,4 of the 2 x 2-game T'p,9 equals
La dJ -L4~AP 9~A9J
The corresponding replicator dynamics
Since q x p, evolutionary stability of p yields Hence, the state [ ó) corresponding to p is not dynamically stable in the derived gamc, although p is dynamically stable in the original game.
Characterization in terms of derived k x k-games
Since the original game can have more than two evolutionarily stable states, it is tempting to consider derived games of k-morphic populations. Here individuals can adopt k z 2 mixcd strategies corresponding, say, to pt, .. .., pk, where p; E S" describe (possibly) polymorphic states of the "old" population. The state of the "new", k-morphic population comprising these p;-individuals is then fully described by a vector x-[ x~, ...., xk ]' E Sk, where x; is the relative frequency of individuals adopting a mixed strategy adapted to the state p;. For instance, a monomorphic population consistin~exclusively of p~-individuals is described by the state e-[ 1, 0, ... 
Remark
To emphasize that x describes the population state with respect to I'P~...,.vt, one could write (x,p~, ...., pk) instead of x. Forrnally, x corresponds to a statistical distribution (i.e. a probability measure) on S" of the form 
Indeed, we have (C'ACx); -p; ACx -p; Am~and x'C'ACx -m'jAmj. Of course the dynamics D(T') and D(I'o~....,ot) are strongly interrelated. For instance, in [11] it is shown that if D(T') is a certain type of gradient system, then so is D(T'P~,.,.,vk).
The results presented in this and the subsequent section dcal with dynamical stability properties of an evolutionarily stable state p in the original game, with respect to the dcrived k-morphism game I'P~.. .., p~, where p~-p while p~, 2 5 j 5 k, are different states of the original population. At first let us generalize theorem 1 (note that the converse of theorem 2 below follows by theorem 1; cf. also (4J and [ 18] ):
Consider k diffcrent states p~, ... , p~in S". If p~is evolutionarily stable for T', and if p~is no convex combination of p~, ..., pt, then p~corresponds to a dynamically stable state e in T'v~.....v.P roof (1) Lct e-(1, 0, ... , OJ' E Sk denote the monomorphic state of the mixed stratcgists' population, where every individual displays strategy p~. We at first show that, under the assumption of the thcorem, the population stratcgy m~dctermines the state e uniyucly. Indeed, suppose that for some x E S`, x x e, (2) Now we prove (pt -m~)Am~~0 whenever x~e is close cnough to e. Indccd, sincc this map z H mj is continuous, m, is close to m, -p~provided that the distance between x and e is sufficiently small. Evolutionary stability of p~in the original gamc I' now yiclds 
whenever x~e is close enough to e. Hence, xt(t) increases towards unity if t-~f~, implying x(t) -a e as t-~t~Thus e constitutes a dynamically stable state for the dynamics D(f'p~...,,04). O

Remark
In (1) and (2) above, we in fact proved that (e -x)'C'ACx -(pt -mx )'Amx~0 whenevcr x x e is close to e, which amounts to evolutionary stability of the state e in the dcrived game I'P~, ,,,,Pk. Thus, invoking the result of [ 13] implying dynamical stability, we obtain an altemative proof of thcorcm 2. However, the above proof has the advantage that it admits an immediatc gcneralization adapted to games with nonlinear payoff; see [3, pp. lÓ4 and 109]. Rcmark further that the condition on p~in theorcm 2 above to be no convex combination of the remaining states pZ, ..., p~, is equivalent to extremality of p~in thc convcx hull of all the statcs p~, ..., p~.
Weak dynamical stability
This section dcals with thc case whcre the extrcmality assumption of theorem 2 is violated. Putting p2 -p~one immediately sces that one cannot hope for dynamical stability of p~in the derived game under these circumstances; moreover, we have thc following general ncgative result: 238
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THEOREM 3
Consider k states p~, .. ., pk in S", whene p~is a convex combination of p2, ...,~. Then the state e in rP~, .,,, ok corresponding to p~cannot be dynamically stable, even if pl were cvolutionarily stablc for the original game i'.
Proof
Assume that p~-E~~z~,~p for some~~2 0, 2 5 j 5 k, with~~.2 .tt -1. Put S-{x E Sk : x~~0 j and consider the function 
V(x(t))~V(x(0)), t large enough, which is absurd since V is a constant of motion for the dynamics D(I'P~,.,.,vk):
indeed, taking logarithms and differentiating with respcct to time t, we get
-(m;(,) -p~)~Ams(r) } I~~ipi~Amz(t) -~~ims(~)'Ams(~)
Hence e cannot be dynamically stable. 0
Remark
One could relate the above result to the proof of theorcm 2 in that thc population strategy mj now does not determine the state x uniquely: more precisely, in any neighbourhood of e there are states x x e with m, -m~-p~and therefore z; -x;(p, -p~)'Ap~-0. Hence e cannot be dynamically stable. The proof above is a variant of an argument of Sigmund [ 11 ] who showed that there is a one-dimensional foliation of Sk undcr the dynamics D (I'P~,...,P~), provided ( p~, . .., pkj are linearly dcpcndcnt. Howcvcr, as thcorcm 2 shows, this foliation necd not be incompatible with dynamical stability of e. On the other hand, the existence of such a foliation might suggcst that e is wcakly dynamically stablc in Lyapunov's scnsc: DEFIMTION 3 A statc p E S" is said to bc "wcakly dynamically stablc" in a gamc i' if and only if p constitutes a Lyapunov-stable fxed poínt for thc rcplicator dynamics D(T'). This mcans that, given any (small) neighbourhood U of p in S", every trajectory starting in S", and closely enough to p, will not leave U.
In other words, a state p is weakly dynamically stable in i', if for any prescribed (small) barricr e~0, cvery state x(t) will remain within a distance from p smaller than E, providcd that t z 0 and that thc distancc from x(0) E S" to p is small enough. Again, the trajcctory x(t), r? 0, dcscribes the evolution of the population according to D( f').
THEOREM 4
Lct p~, ..., pk be k statcs in S". If pt is evolutionarily stablc for i', then pc orresponds to a weakly dynamically stable equilibrium in I'P~,.,,,Pk.
Proof
Similarly to the proof of thcorem 2, we derive from evolutionary stability of p~that Xi(t) ? 0 holds in thc dynamics D (I'o~" ,., p~) , whencver x(t) is close to e, e.g. if x(t) E UE, whcre we put Uf-(xESk:x~~l-E;, e~0 bcing sufficicntly small. Since this means that x~(t) cannot decrease as time t 2 0 increascs, provided that x(0) E U~, we conclude x(t) E UE for all t z 0. Because UE constitutes a neighbourhood of e in Sk, which shrinks to e as e~. 0, weak dynamical stability of e is thus established. induces a dynamics where e is even globally asymptotically stable (see fig. 1 ).
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Characterization in terms of stable sels
This last section deals with a more general characterization result along lines similar to that followed by Thomas in [15, 16] . If one is interested only in the time evolution of observable charatcristics like the population strategy m,t,l rather than in the evolution of the states themselves, then the following question becomes important: suppose that )~E S" is an evolu[ionarily stable statc with respcct to a game T', and consider the derived game I'P~, ....o~, whcre~is a convex combination of the states pt, ..., p,~; if x(t) denotes a trajectory subject to the dynamics D ( I'p~.. ,,,P~) , will the population strategy m,t,l converge to p or not? In other words, we ask whether or not the states x(t) will approach the set R~-(xESk:ms-~j as time goes on (observe that the map x t-r mj -~j: i xipi is unifotmly continuous on Sk so that both formulations of the qucstion arc indccd equivalcnt). Using a notion from thc thcory of dynamical systcros, this question amounts to asking whcthcr or not the set Ry is stable in the following sense:
Considcr a dynamics Dopcrating on Sk; a set R~Sk is said lo bc "(dynamically) stable", if thcrc is a sct U~St which is opcn in Sk and which contains R, such that every trajectory staning in U approaches R. is the minimum Euclidean distance from x to R~( Ilzll -z~z denotes the usual Euclidean norm of a vector z E II2').
The following result shows that thc question formulatcd above can be answercd positively, and moreover provides a general dynamical characterization of evolutionary stability that covers all cases discussed in sections 2 and 3. For the reader's convenience, we specify a proof which is a slight modification of Thomas's arguments [16] ; see also (4, thcorcm 1 ].
THEOREM 5
Lct p E S" be a state in thc game I'. Then the following assenions arc cyuivalent:
(1) p is cvolutionary stablc (with respect to T');
(2) for all dcrivcd gamcs 1'P~,. .,P~, such that~is a convcx combination of the states p~, ..., pk, the set R~is dynamically stable with respect to the dynamics rv~, . . . . vt).
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Proof
(1)~(2): considcr an arbitrary state X e R~, i.e. tulfilling mY -~; we first construct an opcn ncighbourhood U~of X in S" that is positivcly invariant undcr  D(T'P~... , , yk) , i.c. fulfills x(t) E U~for all t? 0 whenevcr x(0) E UA (similar to the proof of thcorem 4, whcre X-e and Ux -Ue). To this end we employ cvolutionary stability of 7 which guarantees the existence of an e~0 such that 
U-UUr~Sk
Ye Ró is opcn in Sk and contains j3. The reasoning above provcs d(x(t), RP ) -a 0 as t--~fw hcnever z(0) E U.
(2)~(1) follows from theorem 1, taking p~-32, p2 -q(an arbitrary state different from p), and observing that in this case R~-([ ó]} holds, so that the stabili[y of Ro is the same as asymptotic stability of [ ó] . 0
The proof of (2)~(1) above already indicatcs why theorem 5 is a gcncralization of theorems 1 and 2: just take~-p~, and observe that the extremality condition on p~is exactly the relation R~-[e). Theorem 4 is no direct consequence of theorcm 5, since the latter cannot exclude the case that a trajectory approaches Ró in an "almost cycling manner", coming eventually arbitrarily close to different statcs~E R~. However, the proof of theorem 5 also proves thcorcm 4, since a trajcctory starting in Ux never leaves it, and bccause the neighbourhoods UÍ shrink towards~as a decreases to zero.
Remark
An altcmativc approach to thcorem 5 would consist in procccding similarly as Zeeman in (20] , namely considering the dynamics for the population strategies:
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whcrc D, -~t~1 x~p~p~-m, mj is thc n x n-dispcrsion matrix of thc state x, i.c. thc variance~covariance-matrix of the distribution~~.tX~áP~(cf. the first remark in scction 3). Thc proof in [20, lemma 7] , however, seems to work only under additional regularity assumptions both on 3 in the original game and on thc dispcrsion malticcs Dzt,) along trajcctorics x(t) near R~. These assumptions are not uscd in the proof prescntcd abovc. For instancc, Zccman's method docs not apply without modi(ications to the setting of thcorcm 3, if k S n; more generally, if lhc rank of C is lcss than n, thcn thc rank of Dj is ncccssarily less than n-1. Similarly, we need to assume ncithcr fullncss nor intcriority, as done in [1, theorcm 3.9] for a much more gencrat sctup.
